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Abstract: This paper analyzes global CO2 emissions growth by fossil fuel type (coal, oil or gas), 
demand type (consumption or investment), country group (developed or developing country) and 
industry group. The results indicate that, among the three fossil fuels, CO2 emissions from coal use 
grew the most rapidly in developing countries, by 3.76 Gt in the period 1995-2009. By contrast, 
CO2 emissions from natural gas use grew the most rapidly in developed countries, by 470 Mt in the 
period 1995-2009. Further decompositions show that, despite improvements in energy efficiency, 
the upgrades in infrastructures and changes in electricity requirements in developing countries have 
led to significant CO2 emissions growth from coal use. Among these countries, China accounts for 
a high contribution, causing a coal-use-related CO2 emissions growth of up to 2.79 Gt in the period 
1995-2009. By contrast, consumption by the public and social services as well as chemical products 
is the dominant force driving CO2 emission growth from gas in developed countries; the US 
accounts for a very high contribution, causing a gas-use-related CO2 emissions growth of up to 100 
Mt.   
 
Keywords: Global CO2 emission growth, Structural decomposition analysis, Fossil fuel type, 
WIOD. 
 
 
  
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Global CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning and industrial processes have doubled over the 
past 40 years, increasing from 16.9 gigatonnes (Gt) in 1974 to 35.5 Gt in 2014, with an annual 
growth rate of 1.8% (BP, 2015). Against the backdrop of the extensive discussions on global climate 
change mitigation, in recent years the growth rate of CO2 emissions have accelerated from 1.0% per 
year for the period 1990-1999 to 2.4% per year for the period 2000-2014 (see also Raupach et al., 
2007, Peters et al., 2012). Both developed countries and developing countries have witnessed 
continuous growth in their production-based CO2 emissions, with developing countries having an 
annual rate of 3.2% for the period 1990-2014, larger than that of developed countries, 0.4% (BP, 
2015). 
According to the Kaya identity, the growth in global CO2 emissions is driven by four factors, 
that is, 𝐶𝑎 =
𝐶𝑎
𝐸
∙
𝐸
𝐺𝐷𝑃
∙
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑃
∙ 𝑃, where Ca is CO2 emissions, P is population, 
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑃
 is gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, 
𝐸
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 is the energy intensity of GDP, and 
𝐶𝑎
𝐸
 is the carbon intensity of 
energy (emissions/energy). Gerland et al. (2014) project that the world population will continue to 
rise within this century, with a 95% chance that it will grow from 6.1 billion in 2000 to 9.0-13.2 
billion by the year 2100. On a century-long basis, Baksi and Green (2007) find that the long-term 
average annual decline in global energy intensity is unlikely to substantially exceed 1.1%. Given an 
increase in GDP per capita is very crucial for improving living standards in developing countries, 
one of the most important ways to curb the growth of CO2 emissions in developing countries is to 
decrease the carbon intensity of energy, i.e., the de-carbonization of energy consumption (see also, 
Wise et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015; Chowdhury et al., 2015; Hong et al., 2015; Thangavelu et al., 
2015; Tokimatsu et al., 2016)1.   
However, the share of renewable energies in global primary energy consumption as a total does 
not show any signs of increasing, especially in developing countries. On the contrary, it has 
remained more or less stable at approximately 13% since 1990 (Figure 1a). This stability may also 
be why we observe the acceleration in global CO2 emissions growth (see also Raupach et al., 2007, 
Peters et al., 2012). Although the share of solar, wind and bio-renewable energies rose from 0.35% 
in 1990 to 2.45% in 2014, that rise has been largely offset by a 1.1 percentage point decline in the 
                                                             
1 Note that an increase in GDP per capita does not necessarily bring an improvement of quality of life or subjective 
well-being in developing countries. Therefore, the intervention in unsustainable lifestyles has been highly 
encouraged to achieve global emission reductions (Malik, et al., 2016). 
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share contributed by nuclear energy - also a low-carbon energy source (see also Green, 2015). In 
terms of countries, the performance of developed countries with regard to renewable energy usage 
is slightly better than that of developing countries. The share of carbon-free renewable energy in 
total primary energy consumption in developing countries has remained steady at 9% during the 
period 1990-2010 and, in 2014, increased to 10% (Figure 1c), whereas that of developed countries 
slowly increased from 13.3% in 1990 to 15.6% in 2000 and 17.9% in 2014 (Figure 1b).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The share of primary energy consumption by energy type, a) world; b) developed countries 
(Annex B); and c) developing countries (non-Annex B), 1990-2014. The data are taken from BP 
statistics (2015). 
 
The stable share of carbon-free renewable energies implies that the total share of fossil fuels in 
global energy consumption has remained relatively steady. Note that this stability does not 
necessarily mean fixed carbon energy intensity. Indeed, there is an internal structural change by 
fossil fuel (Fig. 1). Developed countries have witnessed an increase in the share of natural gas by 
5.0 percentage points from 1990 to 2014 and drops in the shares of coal and oil by 5.5 and 4.1 
percentage points, respectively (Fig. 1b). Meanwhile, developing countries have witnessed a drop 
in the share of oil by 9.2 percentage points and increases in the shares of coal and gas by 3.4 and 
4.2 percentage points, respectively (Fig. 1c). On average, coal and oil have higher carbon contents 
than gas when generating the same amount of heat2. The change in the relative share of different 
fossil fuels may lead to changes in the total CO2 emissions for an economy, even when its total 
primary energy consumption remains the same. As suggested by Figure 2, CO2 emissions from gas 
use increased significantly over time in developed countries, whereas CO2 emissions from coal use 
increased significantly in developing countries.  
 
                                                             
2 On average, coal has the highest carbon contents, with 3.96 tons of CO2 per ton of oil equivalent (toe), followed 
by oil (2.35 tons of CO2 per toe) and natural gas (3.07tons of CO2 per toe) (BP, 2015). 
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Figure 2. CO2 emissions by fuel type, a) world; b) developed countries (Annex B); and c) developing 
countries (non-Annex B), 1990-2013. The data are taken from the International Energy Agency 
(www.iea.org). 
 
Due to the separation of emissions caused by international trade, the increasing attention to 
global CO2 emissions has shifted from a production-based perspective to a consumption-based 
perspective (see, e.g., Munksgaard and Pedersen, 2001; Gallego and Lenzen, 2005; Lenzen et al., 
2007; Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Arto and Dietzenbacher, 2014). That is, concern has shifted from 
answering the question “Who emits?” to answering the question “For whom is it emitted?”. For 
example, Arto and Dietzenbacher (2014) used WIOD and found that the changes in the levels of 
consumption per capita and population growth have dominated global CO2 emissions growth for 
the period 1995-2008. However, there are scarce studies that discuss the reasons behind the CO2 
emissions growths by fossil fuel type from the consumption-based perspective. One of the pioneer 
studies might be from Malik et al. (2016). Based on Eora, they decomposed the global CO2 emission 
growth by fuel type for the period 1990-2010, and demonstrate that affluence (per-capita 
consumption) and population growth are outpacing any improvements in carbon efficiency in 
driving up emissions worldwide. In this paper, based on the WIOD, we further distinguish the final 
demand into consumption and investment, and employ a structural decomposition model (SDA) to 
explore the driving forces behind global CO2 emissions growth by demand type (consumption or 
investment), country group (developed or developing country), fossil fuel type (coal, oil or gas) and 
industry group. By such a decomposition, we hope to understand the global CO2 emissions growth 
at a more detailed level. For example, for whom gas-use-related CO2 has been emitted in developed 
countries or for whom coal-use-related CO2 has been emitted in developing countries? Is there a 
difference in the demand structures and consumption bundles between developed and developing 
countries that have led to different oil, coal, and gas requirements? It is hoped that doing so may 
illuminate the questions noted above. 
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2. Methodology and Data 
In this paper, we employed a structural decomposition model (SDA) based on a global multi-
regional input-output (GMRIO) framework to explore the reasons behind global CO2 emissions 
growth by fossil fuel type and region. The GMRIO framework has been widely accepted to analyze 
the global energy consumption and CO2 emissions growth (see, Wiedmann, 2009; Arto and 
Dietzenbacher, 2015; Mundaca et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015; Brizga et al., 2016; Lan et al., 2016). 
Table 1 presents the GMRIO framework employed in this paper. The diagonal matrices of 
intermediate use give the intra-regional intermediate deliveries. For example, the elements zij
rr of 
matrix Zrr give the intermediate deliveries from industry i in region r to industry j in region r, with 
i, j =1,…,m, where m is the number of industries, and r =1,…,n, where n is the number of regions. 
The non-diagonal matrices indicate inter-regional intermediate deliveries. For example, the 
elements zij
rs of matrix Zrs indicate the deliveries of products from industry i (=1,..,m) in country r 
(=1,..,n) for input use in industry j (=1,..,m) in country s (=1,..,n; ≠ r). The matrices of final demand 
have a similar structure; they are divided by consumption (including consumption by households, 
governments and non-government organizations), 𝐅𝐜
𝐫𝐬(r, s=1,...,n), and investment (for fixed capital 
formation), 𝐅𝐢
𝐫𝐬 (r, =1,...,n). 
 
Table 1. The multi-regional input-output framework 
 Intermediate Use Final Use  
Total  
Output 
Country 1 … Country n Country 1 
… 
Country n 
Industry 
1,.., m 
Industry 
1,…,m 
Cons. Inv. Cons. Inv. 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 U
se
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 1
 
in
d
u
st
ry
 
11Z
 
… 
nZ 1  11
cF  
11
iF  … 
n
cF
1
 
n
iF
1
 1X  
… … … … …   …  … … 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 n
 
in
d
u
st
ry
 
1nZ  … 
nnZ  1n
cF  
1n
iF  … 
nn
cF  
nn
iF  
nX  
Value Added 1V  … 
nV  
Total Inputs 1X  … 
nX  
 
According to Table 1, we have row equilibrium in matrix notation as follows: 
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[
𝐙𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝐙𝟏𝐧
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐙𝐧𝟏 ⋯ 𝐙𝐧𝐧
] + [
𝐅𝐜
𝟏𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝐅𝐜
𝟏𝐧 + 𝐅𝐢
𝟏𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝐅𝐢
𝟏𝐧
⋯
𝐅𝐜
𝐧𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝐅𝐜
𝐧𝐧 + 𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝐧 + ⋯ + 𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝐧
] = [
𝐗𝟏
⋮
𝐗𝐧
]                    (1) 
The direct input coefficients can then be obtained by normalizing the columns in the IO table; 
that is:
 𝐀𝐫𝐬 = 𝐙𝐫𝐬(𝐗?̂?)−𝟏                                                          (2) 
where r, s=1,...,n, and (𝐗?̂?)−𝟏 denotes the inverse of a diagonal matrix of total outputs in 
region s.  
Define the input coefficients matrix 𝐀 = [
𝐀𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝐀𝟏𝐧
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐀𝐧𝟏 ⋯ 𝐀𝐧𝐧
] where 𝐀𝐫𝐬 is the input coefficient 
from region r to region s. Then, the Leontief inverse can be calculated as 𝐁 = (𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏; that is, 
𝐁 = [
𝑩𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝑩𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑩𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝑩𝒏𝒏
] = [
𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏 ⋯ −𝑨𝟏𝒏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−𝑨𝒏𝟏 ⋯ 𝑰 − 𝑨𝒏𝒏
]
−1
, where I is the identity matrix with diagonal 
elements as ones and non-diagonal elements as zeros. The Leontief inverse describes both the direct 
and indirect linkages across countries and sectors.  
Using 𝐄𝐨
𝐫  to denote CO2 emissions linked to fossil fuel type o (=coal, oil and gas) in region r 
and 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝐫 = 𝐄𝐨
𝐫(𝐗?̂?)−1 to denote the carbon emissions intensity per unit of output linked to fossil 
fuel type o (=coal, oil and gas) in region r, CO2 emissions by fuel type generated along global 
production chains can be calculated as follows: 
 [
𝐸𝑜
1𝑝
⋮
𝐸𝑜
𝑛𝑝
] = [
𝐂?̂?𝐨
𝟏 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
𝟎 𝟎 𝐂?̂?𝐨
𝐧
] [
𝐁𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝐁𝟏𝐧
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐁𝐧𝟏 ⋯ 𝐁𝐧𝐧
] [
𝐅𝐜
𝟏𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝐅𝐜
𝟏𝐧 + 𝐅𝐢
𝟏𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝐅𝐢
𝟏𝐧
⋯
𝐅𝐜
𝐧𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝐅𝐜
𝐧𝐧 + 𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝟏 + ⋯ + 𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝐧
]     (3a) 
 [
𝐸𝑜
1𝑐
⋮
𝐸𝑜
𝑛𝑐
] = [𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟏 ⋯ 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝐧] [
𝐁𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝐁𝟏𝐧
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐁𝐧𝟏 ⋯ 𝐁𝐧𝐧
] [
𝐅𝐜
𝟏𝟏 + 𝐅𝐢
𝟏𝟏 ⋯ 𝐅𝐜
𝟏𝐧 + 𝐅𝐢
𝟏𝐧
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐅𝐜
𝐧𝟏 + 𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝟏 ⋯ 𝐅𝐜
𝐧𝐧 + 𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝐧
]          (3b) 
 Eq. (3a) calculates the production-based CO2 emissions by fuel type o (=coal, oil and gas) in 
region r (=1,...,n), whereas eq. (3b) calculates the consumption-based CO2 emissions by fuel type o 
(=coal, oil and gas) because of the final demand in region r (=1,...,n). The WIOD divides sectors 
and regions into 35 sectors and 41 regions, as shown in Appendix Table A; therefore, we have n=41 
and 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝐫  (r=1,...,41) as a 1*35 vector, Brs(r,s=1,..,41) as a 35*35 matrix, and 𝐅𝐜
𝐫𝐬  and 𝐅𝐢
𝐫𝐬 
(r,s=1,..,41) as a 35*1 matrix. 
 Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA) has been extensively applied to decompose the 
global energy use and emissions growth (see, e.g. Hoekstra et al., 2016; Malik and Lan, 2016; Malik 
et al., 2016 and Lenzen (2016) for a very recent review). The decomposition in consumption-based 
CO2 emissions by fuel type can be conducted according to eq. (3). To simplify the analysis, we 
firstly conduct the decompositions on a full WIOD table, and then aggregate the results of 
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decompositions from 41 regions as shown in the WIOD into two group, i.e., developed countries 
that fall into the Annex B countries list and developing countries that are not Annex B countries 
(non-Annex B countries) (see also Peters et al., 2012)3. In addition, given that China has a high 
dependency on coal and the world’s largest CO2 emissions, we separate China from the developing 
countries group to avoid distorting the picture of developing countries. That is, we explore the 
driving forces behind the consumption-based CO2 emission by fuel type for three country groups: 
developed countries (Annex B), China, and developing countries excluding China (non-Annex B 
excluding China).  
 Arto and Dietzenbacher (2014) have found that final demand is the dominant force driving 
global CO2 growth. Given that investment, especially infrastructure construction, is highly carbon-
intensive (see also Perz, 2014), we further divide final demand into consumption and investment. 
We also separate the demand of developed countries and developing countries, and of these groups, 
the largest developed country, the US (r = 41 in the WIOD), and the largest developing country, 
China (r =7 in WIOD), are singled out. The idea is to trace the global CO2 emission growth by fuel 
type into specific types of demand for specific countries groups. That is, we have consumption for 
four country groups as follows: 𝐅𝒄
𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒙 𝑩 = [
∑ 𝐹𝑐
𝑟1𝑟=1,…,𝑛
𝑟∈𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑥 𝐵
⋮
∑ 𝐹𝑐
𝑟𝑛𝑟=1,…,𝑛
𝑟∈𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑥 𝐵
], 𝐅𝒄
𝑼𝑺 = [
𝐹𝑐
41,1
⋮
𝐹𝑐
41,𝑛
], 𝐅𝒄
𝒏𝒐𝒏−𝑨𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒙 𝑩 =
[
∑ 𝐹𝑐
𝑟1𝑟=1,…,𝑛
𝑟∈𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑥 𝐵
⋮
∑ 𝐹𝑐
𝑟𝑛𝑟=1,…,𝑛
𝑟∈𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑥 𝐵
] and 𝐅𝒄
𝑪𝑯𝑵 = [
𝐹𝑐
7,1
⋮
𝐹𝑐
7,1
]. Similarly we can have the level of investment of the 
four country groups as follows: 𝐅𝐢
𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁, 𝐅𝐢
𝐔𝐒, 𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝐨𝐧−𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁 and 𝐅𝐢
𝐂𝐇𝐍. 
Then, we can decompose the CO2 emissions growth from the demand perspective. For example, 
for the CO2 emissions of China (r = 7) linked to fuel type o (=coal, oil and gas) for year t, we have: 
𝐸𝑜
7𝑝(𝑡)
= [0 ⋯ 0 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) 0 ⋯ 0] [
𝐁𝟏𝟏(𝐭) ⋯ 𝐁𝟏𝐧(𝐭)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐁𝐧𝟏(𝐭) ⋯ 𝐁𝐧𝐧(𝐭)
] [
𝐹𝑐
11(𝑡) + ⋯ + 𝐹𝑐
1𝑛(𝑡) + 𝐹𝑖
11(𝑡) + ⋯ + 𝐹𝑖
1𝑛(𝑡)
⋯
𝐹𝑐
𝑛1(𝑡) + ⋯ + 𝐹𝑐
𝑛𝑛(𝑡) + 𝐹𝑖
𝑛1(𝑡) + ⋯ + 𝐹𝑖
𝑛𝑛(𝑡)
] 
= 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) ∙ 𝐅(𝐭)                                                           (5) 
 Then, we have the decomposition from year t-1 to year t based on the average of the polar 
decompositions: 
∆𝐸𝑜
7𝑝 = 𝐸𝑜
7𝑝(𝑡) − 𝐸𝑜
7𝑝(𝑡 − 1) 
                                                             
3 Note that the WIOD covers the majority of Annex B countries but excludes Belarus, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco and Ukraine. Please refer to Appendix Table A for more details. 
 
8 
 
 = 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) ∙ 𝐅(𝐭) − 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐅(𝐭 − 𝟏) 
 =
1
2
[𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) − 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐁(𝐭) ∙ 𝐅(𝐭) + 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐅(𝐭 − 𝟏)]                    (6a) 
 +
1
2
𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ [𝐁(𝐭) − 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ 𝐅(𝐭 − 𝟏) +
1
2
𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ [𝐁(𝐭) − 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ 𝐅(𝐭)    (6b) 
 +
1
2
[𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) + 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐅𝐜
𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁(𝐭) − 𝐅𝐜
𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)]         (6c) 
 +
1
2
[𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) + 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐅𝐜
𝐔𝐒(𝐭) − 𝐅𝐜
𝐔𝐒(𝐭 − 𝟏)]                (6d) 
 +
1
2
[𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) + 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐅𝐜
𝐧𝐨𝐧−𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁(𝐭) − 𝐅𝐜
𝐧𝐨𝐧−𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] (6e) 
 +
1
2
[𝑪𝑨𝒐
𝟕(𝒕) ∙ 𝐁(𝒕) + 𝑪𝑨𝒐
𝟕(𝒕 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝒕 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐅𝐜
𝐂𝐇𝐍(𝐭) − 𝐅𝐜
𝐂𝐇𝐍(𝐭 − 𝟏)]             (6f) 
 +
1
2
[𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) + 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐅𝐢
𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁(𝐭) − 𝐅𝐢
𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)]         (6g) 
 +
1
2
[𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) + 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐅𝐢
𝐔𝐒(𝐭) − 𝐅𝐢
𝐔𝐒(𝐭 − 𝟏)]                (6h) 
 +
1
2
[𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) + 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝐨𝐧−𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁(𝐭) − 𝐅𝐢
𝐧𝐨𝐧−𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] (6i) 
 +
1
2
[𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) + 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟕 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏)] ∙ [𝐅𝐢
𝐂𝐇𝐍(𝐭) − 𝐅𝐢
𝐂𝐇𝐍(𝐭 − 𝟏)]              (6j) 
where eq. (6a) gives the effect of changes in carbon intensity per unit of Chinese output on China’s 
CO2 emissions growth by fuel type o (=coal, oil and gas); eq. (6b) gives the effect of changes in the 
input structure and intermediate trade bundle (Leontief inverse B); eq. (6c) – (6f) give the effects of 
changes in the consumption of developed countries (Annex B) excluding the US, the US, developing 
countries (non-Annex B) excluding China, and China, respectively; and eq. (6g) – (6j) give the 
effects of changes in the investment of developed countries (Annex B) excluding the US, the US, 
developing countries (non-Annex B) excluding China, and China, respectively. 
 Let 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁 indicate the carbon intensity vector for the developed (Annex B) country group 
where the sub-vector of Annex B countries are filled with exact numbers and that of developing 
(non-Annex B) countries are filled with zeros, and let 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝐧𝐨𝐧−𝐀𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐱 𝐁 indicate the carbon intensity 
vector for the developing (non-Annex B) country group excluding China; the CO2 emissions growth 
of developed countries (Annex B) and developing countries (non-Annex B excl. China) by fuel type 
o (=coal, oil and gas) can be decomposed similarly. The WIOD provides the GMRIO table of year 
t in constant prices of year t-1 for the period 1995-2009; thus, we can decompose the global 
emissions growth from any year t to year t+1 in constant prices.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Decomposition results of CO2 emissions growth by fuel type and country group 
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In Figure 3, we decompose the cumulative CO2 emissions growth by fuel type and country 
group from a demand perspective, where “demand” is divided into eight groups. More specifically, 
we decompose the CO2 emissions growth year by year in constant prices and summarize them as 
cumulative decomposition results for the period 1995-2009. 
Comparing the magnitudes of CO2 emissions growths indicates that Chinese CO2 emissions 
from coal use have the highest growth within the period 1995-2009, with an increase of 2794 Mt, 
followed by the CO2 emissions from coal and gas use of developing countries excluding China, with 
increases of 967 Mt and 814 Mt, respectively. At 471 Mt, the CO2 emissions from gas of developed 
countries also have substantial increases. The CO2 emissions from gas of China only increased by 
132 Mt, whereas the CO2 emissions from oil of developed countries decreased by 506 Mt. Note that 
the developing countries (incl. China) and developed countries show completely different trend 
during the period 2007-2009 when international financial crisis happened. The CO2 emissions from 
coal, oil and gas use in China keep growing from 2007 to 2009, by 641 Mt, 48 Mt and 36 Mt, 
respectively. The developing countries (excl. China) also experienced growths in CO2 emissions, 
mainly from coal and gas, increased by 155 Mt and 63 Mt respectively during 2007-2009. On 
contrary, developed countries experienced serious reduction of CO2 emissions from coal, oil and 
gas use by respective 555 Mt, 362 Mt and 124 Mt for the same period.  
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Figure 3. The decompositions of cumulative CO2 emissions growth by fuel type and country 
group, 1995-2009, in million tons (Mt) 
 
Considerable differences lie in the contributions behind the CO2 emissions growth by fuel type 
in 1995-2008. Although the change in carbon intensity has been the dominant force driving the 
decrease in CO2 emissions, the effects vary to a large extent. If only the coal-use-related carbon 
intensity (i.e. CO2 emission from coal use per output) of China – which includes a shift to cleaner 
coal bundle and less coal consumption per output – decreased in the manner it actually did while 
everything else had remained constant, then China’s CO2 emissions in 2009 would have decreased 
by 2803 Mt compared to the 1995 level (Fig. 3g). The share of coal in the total primary energy 
consumption of China only decreased slightly, from 75.3% in 1995 to 72.6% in 2009. The 
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implication is that China’s energy intensity per output actually decreased substantially for the same 
period. The change in the oil-use-related carbon intensity of developing countries (excl. China) and 
developed countries also led to substantial decreases in the CO2 emissions in these countries of 1612 
Mt and 1725 Mt, respectively. Further investigation shows that the share of oil in total primary 
energy consumption dropped by 7.5 and 1.7 percentage points in developing (excl. China) and 
developed countries during 1995-2009, respectively. Given the similar carbon contents in different 
types of petroleum, the implication is that developed countries generally have a larger reduction in 
energy intensity than developing countries (excl. China). The IEA statistics confirm that both 
developed countries (Annex B countries) and China have reduced their energy intensity per GDP 
by 23.9% and 31.1%, respectively, by using purchasing power parities (in constant prices) whereas 
developing countries (non-Annex B excluding China) only reduced their energy intensity by 8.6% 
during 1995-2009. Therefore, the reductions in CO2 emissions from coal use in China and CO2 
emissions from oil use in developed countries derived from the change in carbon intensity are 
mainly attributable to an improvement in energy efficiency, whereas the reduction in CO2 emissions 
from oil use in developing countries (excluding China) derived from the change in carbon intensity 
is mainly attributable to a shift from oil to other fossil fuels. 
Note that the change in carbon intensity led to only a very small reduction in CO2 emissions 
from gas use in general – that is, 12 Mt for China and 117 Mt for developed countries in 1995-2009. 
Further exploration shows that the share of gas in total primary energy expanded by 1.8 and 2.2 
percentage points in China and developed countries, respectively. Given the considerable drops in 
energy intensity in China and developed countries for the same period, these countries may tend to 
use more gas when generating the same amount of output, e.g., a structural shift toward sectors that 
heavily rely on gas rather than coal or oil. We return to this point below in section 3.2. 
The change in intermediate inputs – which includes the change in the input structure and trade 
pattern of intermediates – has led to different changes in the CO2 emissions in developed countries 
and developing countries. If only the intermediate inputs changed as they did and the other factors 
remained constant, then the CO2 emissions from coal and gas use in developed countries in 2009 
would have decreased by 597 Mt and 239 Mt compared to the 1995 level, respectively. By contrast, 
the change in the intermediate inputs in developing countries including China would have led to an 
increase of their CO2 emissions by all fuel types, for a total increase of 3290 Mt. Unlike developed 
countries, developing countries have a high level of dependency on manufacturing and have 
experienced a shift of production from labor-intensive to capital-intensive methods. As a result, in 
recent years, the ratios of intermediates over output in China, for example, have shown an increasing 
trend. Meanwhile developed countries are mainly concentrated on low-energy-intensive services. 
In addition, there is a sign that, in recent decades, the global manufacturing center has shifted from 
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developed countries to China and some other emerging countries such as India, Brazil, and Mexico 
(see, e.g., Lehmann, 2012; Stratfor, 2013; AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2014). This phenomenon may 
explain the controversial roles played by the change in intermediate inputs for CO2 emissions 
changes in developed and developing countries.  
With respect to the effects of final demands, domestic demands are the major force driving 
CO2 emissions changes, regardless of country group and fuel type. That is, the change in final 
demands of China itself has dominated the growth in CO2 emissions in China, and so on. If we 
further divide the final demands into consumption and investment, then the performances of 
developed countries and developing countries show substantial differences. The changes in 
consumption in the US and other developed countries together dominate their own CO2 emissions 
change, whereas the growth in US consumption has led to a total CO2 emissions growth of 958 Mt 
during 1995-2009; and the growth in consumption of all other developed countries (excl. US) has 
led to a total CO2 emissions growth of 1285 Mt for the same period. At the end of 2012, the total 
population of the US was approximately 314 million, less than half the total of all other developed 
countries (Annex B countries excluding US), which was approximately 759 million (World Bank, 
2014). This difference suggests that, for the period 1995-2009, the US consumption structure has 
moved toward a bundle that is much more carbon-intensive than other developed countries did for 
the period 1995-2009. In general, the European Union and Japan play much more active roles in 
global climate change mitigation than the US does. 
The change in the consumption of developing countries (non-Annex B countries excl. China) 
is also the dominant force of their own CO2 emissions growth, for a total effect of 2623 Mt during 
1995-2009. Their CO2 emissions from oil use are especially influenced by the change in 
consumption, increasing by 1173 Mt. Unlike developed countries, the change in investment 
demands also plays a significant role in CO2 emissions growth, leading to a total growth of 763 Mt 
as the second major driving force. The reason is in developing countries a series of infrastructures, 
such as roads, railways and power plants, remain in short supply. Their construction requires a 
considerable amount of steel, cement, and primary energy and is therefore highly carbon-intensive 
given the high dependence on fossil fuels for baseload energy. 
The change in capital investment demands in China even outperformed its change in 
consumption and became the major force driving China’s CO2 emissions growth. It brought growths 
of 1928 Mt of CO2 emissions from coal use, 274 Mt of CO2 emissions from oil use, and 58 Mt of 
CO2 emissions from gas use in China, for a total increase of 2260 Mt during 1995-2009. In recent 
decades, China has experienced an unprecedented level of infrastructural growth. For example, 
China’s total highway mileage increased from 1.15 million km to 3.86 million km, and the electricity 
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generation capacity more than tripled for the period 1995-20094. This type of growth has not only 
contributed to social and economic development in China but also entailed considerable CO2 
emissions.  
The change in consumption in China has brought a total CO2 emissions growth of 1209 Mt 
during 1995-2009. At the end of 2012, the total population of China was approximately 1350 million, 
almost equivalent to that of all developed countries and less than 1/3 of all other developing 
countries (excl. China). Recalling the fact that the changes in consumption in developed countries 
and developing countries (excl. China) have led to growths of 2243 Mt and 2623 Mt of CO2 
emissions for the same period, respectively, it implies that developed countries have moved the most 
significantly toward a carbon-intensive consumption bundle, followed by China and then the 
remaining developing countries.   
It is therefore not surprising that developed and developing countries show completely 
different trend of changes during the period 2007-2009 when international financial crisis happened. 
Fuelled by the growth in investment, the CO2 emissions from coal, oil and gas use in China have 
witnessed a total growth of 567 Mt from 2007 to 2009. Similarly, the growth in investment led to a 
total of 110 Mt growth of CO2 emissions from coal, oil and gas use during 2007-2009. On contrast, 
developed countries have experienced serious shrunk of consumption during the international 
financial crisis, as a result their CO2 emissions has been reduced by 276 Mt during 2007-2009. 
It should be noted that although both China and the developing countries group have 
experienced a growth in CO2 emissions that is mainly led by capital investment, their dependency 
on fuel by fuel type is different. Over 90% of China’s investment-driven CO2 emissions are from 
coal, whereas these emissions in other developing countries (excl. China) are almost equally 
distributed among coal, oil and gas. China has a high level of dependency on coal as the primary 
energy input (above 70% in 2008), and its share of coal in total primary energy consumption is much 
higher than that in other developing countries (approximately 40% in 2008). Given that coal has 
higher carbon contents than the equivalent level of oil and gas, this phenomenon may also be one 
of the reasons behind China’s considerable growth in CO2 emissions. 
 
3.2 The top 5 industries with the largest effects on CO2 emission growth by fuel type and 
country group, prior to economic crisis 
 
                                                             
4The data are taken from www.stats.gov.cn. 
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Figure 3 only sketches the overall patterns of CO2 emissions by fuel type from the demand 
perspective. Given the dominant role played by the change in final demands, it is interesting to 
further explore the differences in the demand structures among the different country groups, e.g., 
whether they have different requirements for different fuel types. In this section, to provide a more 
explicit picture, we focus on the top 5 industries for which the changes in final demand bring the 
largest CO2 emissions growth when all other factors remain constant. That is, we adapt the 
decomposition formula (6) as follows: 
 ∆𝐸𝑜
𝑝 = 𝐸𝑜
𝑝(𝑡) − 𝐸𝑜
𝑝(𝑡 − 1) 
 = 𝐂𝐀𝐨 (𝐭) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭) ∙ 𝐅
𝐢(𝐭) − 𝐂𝐀𝐨 (𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐁(𝐭 − 𝟏) ∙ 𝐅
𝐢(𝐭 − 𝟏)                      (7) 
where 𝐂𝐀𝐨 = [𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟏 ⋯ 𝐂𝐀𝐨
𝟒𝟏]  indicates the global carbon intensity matrix, B indicates the 
Leontief inverse, and 𝐅𝒊 indicates the matrix of consumption or investment for industry i (=1,...,35). 
Given that developed countries and most developing countries experienced serious decrease of 
consumptions especially in 2009, we only focus on the period 1995-2008. To simplify the study, we 
only focus on the changes in consumption or capital investment for which the derived global CO2 
growth exceeds 200 Mt.  
Table 2 summarizes the top 5 industries for each fuel type, final demand and country group, 
their corresponding subtotal effect on global CO2 emissions growth, and the concentration ratio 
(subtotal effect/total effect of all 35 industries). First, Table 2 shows that investment-led CO2 
emission growth is highly concentrated in a few industries. The top 5 industries explain 84%-96% 
of all 35 industries’ investment-led CO2 growth; that is, the concentration ratios of the top 5 
industries range from 84% to 96% for investment. Meanwhile regarding consumption, the 
concentration ratio ranges from 40% to 67%. More specifically, the changes in capital investment 
in construction and few “high-end” manufacturing sectors, such as machinery (ind. 13), electrical 
and optical equipment (ind. 14) and transport equipment (ind. 15), dominate the CO2 emissions 
growth in all developing countries. Construction that is largely attributable to upgrades in 
infrastructure alone has a concentration ratio of approximately 65% for the investment-led CO2 
emissions growth in developing countries including China. The remaining 35% of investment-led 
CO2 emissions growth is mainly attributable to the upgrading of machinery for production in 
manufacturing industries, especially high-end manufacturing industries. Production in developing 
countries has shifted from labor-intensive methods to capital-intensive methods. As a result, 
considerable requirements for capital investment in infrastructure and these “high-end” 
manufacturing sectors have been stimulated, consequently leading to a considerable growth in CO2 
emissions in developing countries.  
With respect to consumption, the pattern of the top 5 industries varies among the three fuel 
types and four country groups. The consumption of electricity (ind. 17) is clearly the largest source 
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of coal-use-related, oil-use-related and gas-use-related CO2 emissions growth in developing 
countries, whereas for developed countries, electricity is the only large source of coal-use-related 
but not oil-use-related or gas-use-related CO2 emissions growth. Developing countries (including 
China) mainly rely on fossil fuels as electricity generation inputs. As a result, electricity (ind. 17) 
alone explains growths of 674 Mt of coal-use-related, 218 Mt of oil-use-related and 384 Mt of gas-
use-related CO2 emission in developing countries (incl. China), for a total of 1276 Mt during 1995-
2008.  
 
Table 2. The top 5 industries with the largest effects on CO2 emissions growth by final demand, fuel 
type and country group, 1995-2008 
Demand 
type 
Fuel 
type 
Country group Top 5 industries 
Subtotal* 
(in Mt) 
Concentration 
ratio 
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
-l
ed
 C
O
2
 g
ro
w
th
 Coal 
Developing excl. China 17 4 3 14 23 776 58.4% 
China 17 3 33 32 31 750 66.9% 
Developed excl. US 17 14 4 29 33 359 49.3% 
US 17 31 33 29 21 283 52.0% 
Oil 
Developing excl. China 17 24 25 3 23 698 46.8% 
Developed excl. US 25 8 33 31 17 218 39.5% 
US 31 33 21 8 22 275 51.9% 
Gas 
Developing excl. China 17 31 3 20 33 605 63.1% 
Developed excl. US 17 8 9 33 31 146 50.6% 
US 31 33 8 9 17 135 62.4% 
In
v
es
tm
en
t-
le
d
 C
O
2
 g
ro
w
th
 
Coal 
Developing excl. China 18 14 13 15 12 617 91.3% 
China 18 13 15 14 12 1611 96.3% 
Developed excl. US 14 13 15 17 30 229 91.5% 
Oil 
Developing excl. China 18 14 15 13 2 368 83.9% 
China 18 13 14 15 20 287 94.8% 
Gas Developing excl. China 18 14 13 2 15 304 90.4% 
* The subtotal indicates the subtotal of global CO2 emissions growth in the period 1995-2008 led by the top 5 
industries of consumption or investment by each fuel type and country group. The concentration ratio gives the share 
of the subtotal in a total 35 industries. 
Industry code: 2=Mining and Quarrying; 3=Food, Beverages and Tobacco; 4=Textiles and Textile Products; 8=Coke, Refined 
Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel; 9=Chemicals and Chemical Products; 12=Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal; 13=Machinery, Nec; 
14=Electrical and Optical Equipment; 15=Transport Equipment; 17=Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; 18=Construction; 
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20=Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; 21=Retail Trade, Except Motor Vehicles 
and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods; 22=Hotels and Restaurants; 23=Inland Transport; 24=Water Transport; 25=Air 
Transport; 27=Post and Telecommunications; 29=Real Estate Activities; 31= Public Administration and Defense, Compulsory 
Social Security; 32=Education; 33=Health and Social Work; 33=Health and Social Work. 
 
By contrast, developed countries rely on a variety of renewable energies, such as wind, solar 
and nuclear energies, to generate electricity. As a result, we find that the growths in CO2 emissions 
from oil and gas use in developed countries are mainly led by few manufacturing and services 
industries such as wholesale and retail (ind. 20 and 21). In addition, the change in consumption in 
public administration and defense (ind. 31) and health and social work (ind. 33) also led to a 
considerable CO2 emissions growth. For the US, the change in consumption in these two industries 
(31 and 32) jointly led to growths of 103 Mt of coal-use-related, 156 Mt of oil-use-related, and 86 
Mt of gas-use-related CO2 emissions, for a total of 345 Mt, which is much higher than the CO2 
emissions growth brought by electricity consumption (145Mt) in the US during 1995-2008. 
There are also differences in the top 5 industries for each fuel type, even within the same 
country group. For developing countries (excl. China), the changes in consumption in food products 
(ind. 3), textiles (ind. 4) and electric and optical equipment (ind. 14) are the major source of coal 
use, leading to a total CO2 emissions growth of 246 Mt during 1995-2008; the changes in 
consumption in the various transportation sectors (ind. 23-25) are the major source of oil use, 
leading to a total CO2 emissions growth of 361 Mt for the same period. For developed countries 
(excl. US), textiles (ind. 4) and real estate activities (ind. 29) are the major source of coal use, 
whereas coke and petroleum (ind. 8) and chemicals (ind. 9) are the major source of gas use. 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Robustness of the results 
 
 Recent years have seen a proliferation of global MRIO tables that are available to analyze the 
global energy use and emissions issues, such as Eora, EXIOBASE, OECD-ICIO, GTAP-MRIO (see 
Tukker and Dietzenbacher (2013) for a review). In addition to each databases adhering to different 
sector and regional compositions, the MRIO tables also source their data from different places and 
have different recipes to construct the data. It is therefore not surprising that each MRIO may 
generate different outcomes (see, e.g. Steen-Olsen et al. (2016), Inomata and Owen (2014) for a 
review). Even though, the insights from different MRIO tables are similar. Moran and Wood (2014), 
for example, compared the results of consumption-based carbon accounts based on four global 
MRIOs: Eora, WIOD, EXIOBASE, and the GTAP-based OpenEU databases. They found that 
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carbon footprint results for most major economies disagree by <10% between MRIOs, and the 
results for the temporal change across models appear to agree.  
To validate our results, we also compare our results with Malik et al. (2006), that used Eora to 
decompose the global CO2 emissions growth by fuel type in 1990-2010. It is found that in spite of 
different region disaggregation and decomposition formula, the basic conclusions are very similar. 
For example, Malik et al.’s assessment of trends in fuel-use reveals affluence (per-capita 
consumption) and population growth are outpacing any improvements in carbon efficiency in 
driving up emissions worldwide. Our decompositions also demonstrated that the growth in demand 
(incl. consumption and investment) is the dominant driving force behind the CO2 emissions growth 
worldwide. By fuel type, Malik et al. (2016) suggest that a number of developed countries (e.g. 
Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom) experienced a shift from coal to natural gas, and in spite 
of the improvement in the emission intensity of coal, the coal demand used for the production of 
electricity and/or heat still drives the growth of coal use and the related CO2 emissions, especially in 
developing countries. All of these are in line with our findings.  
4.2 Conclusion 
Our decompositions indicate that, despite the improvements in energy efficiency, the growth 
in final demands has led to considerable CO2 growth worldwide, where developed countries (Annex 
B) and developing countries (non-Annex B) have very different performances in terms of changes 
by fuel type and demand type. In recent years, the demands for infrastructure and electricity in 
developing countries account for the largest contribution, leading to 3.02 Gt and 1.10 Gt of global 
CO2 emissions growth, respectively, in the period 1995-2009. Among others, China accounts for a 
significant share. The improvement in infrastructure and the high dependency on coal for electricity 
generation in China alone has contributed over 2.46 Gt of global CO2 emissions growth. By contrast, 
the change in infrastructure and electricity demand in developed countries only lead to a total CO2 
emission growth of less than 1.0 Gt. For this growth the reason is not only that developed countries 
already have well-functioning infrastructure but also that they have a much higher share of 
renewable energy use. From the perspective of sustainable development, the ratios of renewable 
energies, such as solar and wind energies, in developing countries still need to be significantly 
increased.   
The growth of CO2 emissions in developed countries is mainly driven by consumption in 
services, especially prior the international crisis in 2007. Among others, the change in consumption 
in the US has led to a growth of 1.01 Gt of global CO2 emissions during 1995-2008, whereas the 
consumption growth of all of the remaining developed countries (excl. US) together has led to a 
total CO2 emissions growth of 1.46 Gt. Given that the population of the US is only half that of the 
remaining developed countries, it seems that the developed countries especially US need to pay 
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more attention on a more environment-friendly method of consumption. 
When we decompose CO2 growth by fuel type and industry group, it is also found that 
developed and developing countries have different patterns in terms of fossil fuel use. For example, 
the change in electricity requirements dominates the coal, oil and gas use of developing countries 
(including China), whereas the consumption changes in coke, petroleum and chemical 
manufacturing play significant roles in the gas use of developed countries. CO2 emissions from gas 
use in developed countries have been found to have a considerable level of growth. In this context, 
the energy efficiency of the coke, petroleum and chemical industries in developed countries may 
need some further improvement for global sustainable development.   
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Appendix table A. Region and Sector list 
 
No. Region Country 
group 
No. Sector 
1 Australia Annex B 1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 
2 Austria Annex B 2 Mining and Quarrying 
3 Belgium Annex B 3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
4 Bulgaria Annex B 4 Textiles and Textile Products 
5 Brazil non-Annex B 5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 
6 Canada Annex B 6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 
7 China non-Annex B 7 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 
8 Cyprus Annex B 8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 
9 Czech Rep. Annex B 9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 
10 Germany Annex B 10 Rubber and Plastics 
11 Denmark Annex B 11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 
12 Spain Annex B 12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 
13 Estonia Annex B 13 Machinery, Nec 
14 Finland Annex B 14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 
15 France Annex B 15 Transport Equipment 
16 United 
Kingdom 
Annex B 16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 
17 Greece Annex B 17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
18 Hungary Annex B 18 Construction 
19 Indonesia non-Annex B 19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles 
and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 
20 India non-Annex B 20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except 
of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
21 Ireland Annex B 21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 
22 Italy Annex B 22 Hotels and Restaurants 
23 Japan Annex B 23 Inland Transport 
24 South Korea Annex B 24 Water Transport 
25 Lithuania Annex B 25 Air Transport 
26 Luxembourg Annex B 26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport 
Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 
27 Latvia Annex B 27 Post and Telecommunications 
28 Mexico non-Annex B 28 Financial Intermediation 
29 Malta Annex B 29 Real Estate Activities 
30 Netherlands Annex B 30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 
31 Poland Annex B 31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security 
32 Portugal Annex B 32 Education 
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33 Romania Annex B 33 Health and Social Work 
34 Russia Annex B 34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 
35 Slovakia Annex B 35 Private Households with Employed Persons 
36 Slovenia Annex B  
37 Sweden Annex B 
38 Turkey Annex B 
39 Taiwan non-Annex B 
40 United States Annex B 
41 Rest of World non-Annex B 
 
 
 
